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The first essential of successful budgeting is a sound
1
organization. Budgets by their very nature go to the heart
of administration. 2 Subscribing to this principle, I will
consider herein the^relationships between budgeting and
organization in the Navy Department.
Since the turn of the century and particularly in the
past decade, great emphasis has been placed upon financial
management and budgeting, with their promise of economy and
efficiency in the Federal Government. Congress has enacted many
statutes and successive administrations have issued many dir-
ectives which have had profound effects on the way of doing
business within the Governmental agencies. How has the Navy
Department adjusted to these changes? Is there current need
for reorganization in this Department to cope with the tide of
budgetary change? These are the questions which have prompted
this discussion.
Some individuals will argue that budgeting should
follow organization and not vice versa but I will dismiss this
F. C. Kurtz, lecture to Navy Graduate Comptrollership
Class, Creorge 'Washington University, Washington, D. C.
February 26, 1958.
2
W. H. Newman, Business Policies and Management
(Cincinnati: Southwestern Publishing Co., 1949), p. 683.
(
2argument at the outset by placing It in the same category as
the cliche: "Which came first, the hen or the egg?" The
central issue is that budgeting requirements and organizational
structure must be compatible. Congress has prescribed that
budgetary structure is to follow certain definitive patterns
and supnort legislated accounting practices. It therefor
follows that where organization is incompatible with budgeting
practice the former^must be changed or recourse must be had
to show Congress the error of its ways.
The foundation and development of the current financial
practices as they have affected the military and particularly
the Navy Department is the subject of Chapter I. Chapter II
describes the Army and Navy organizational framework within
which financial management has been accommodated. The Army
organization is presented because it is a contrasting approach
to that which the Navy has taken in adjusting to the same
changes in business management. This contrast is of particular
Importance since the unification of the Armed Forces with the
accompanying desire of the Department of Defense to control
all three Military Departments through uniform patterns.
Departing from the general discussion of the chapters
mentioned above, Chapter III deals with the manner in which
the Navy has handled a service-wide appropriation which is
inimical to its bureau responsibility pattern. The steps in
the development of this appropriation are also traced. Chapter
IV also deals with a service-wide appropriation which higher
authorities have been pressing the Navy to adopt.

3In Chapter V is presented a summary of the highlights
in budgeting developments and organizational controls associa-
ted therewith. Although certain conclusions are presented
in this final chapter, I do not propose to raiBe, or much less
answer, all the questions which arise in connection with the
many facets of this problem in so vast an organization as the
Navy. I can only hone to stimulate the reader to give serious
thought to the major problem areas.

CHAPTER I
DEVELOPMENT OF THE BUDGETARY PHILOSOPHY
The Constitution states that no money shall be drawn
from the Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made
by law. Originally Congress fulfilled this requirement by
voting a lump sum for the Army, there being no Navy Department
at that time. But this happy state of flexibility in military
funding lasted only until 1794, when Congress began appropriat-
ing money by object of expenditure. The issue then became the
degree of specification to which Congress should resort in
appropriating funds. Alexander Hamilton expressed this very
aptly in one of his Lucius Cassius letters:
... in providing for transportation of an army,
oats and hay are each susceptible of a definition
and an estimate and a precise sum may be appropriated
for each separately. ... If the aopropriations be
distinct and the officer who is to make the provision
be not at liberty to divert the fund from one of these
objects to the other. . . . The horses of the Army
^
may in such a case starve and its movement be arrested.
This degree of specification varied with the mood of
Congress and the ire of Congressmen at the military for over-
obligating funds. Congress jealously guarded its control of
^Constitution of the United States, Article 1,
Section IX.
h
Arthur Smithies, The Budgetary Process in the United
States (flew York: McGraw Hill Book Co., 1951), p. 52.

5the puree strings and paid little heed to any Presidential
responsibility in funding matters* ^h the growth in the
Federal Government new agencies were created by Congress and
funds were provided by this body to implement the work of these
agencies. The Navy Department was provided with its bureaus
and the War Department with its technical services through
this route. Until recently these agency heads went directly to
the Congress for funds they required. These funds were Justi-
fled on the basis of the object to be bought (personnel ser-
vices, transportation, etc.) and were made available on this
basis directly to the agency.
About the beginning of the twentieth century the
United States became a "billion dollar country", that is, the
aggregate of appropriations began to exceed a billion dollars
annually. V ith this turn of events came a realization that
responsibility and control must be introduced into Federal
spending. Budgeting could no longer be considered solely a
means to appropriations but in addition the element of control
must be introduced. The first Important action instituted
toward solving problems associated with Federal budgeting was
the appointment of the Commission on Economy and Efficiency
by President Taft in 1910. In 1912 this Commission reported
on the need for a national budget and a uniform accounting
and budgeting system for the Federal Government. The Commis-
sion held that a sense of proportion in the national program
could come only from those who must assume responsibility for

6the administration as a whole. 5 President Taft transmitted
the recommendations of his commission to Congress but
implementing action was not taken. The Democrats were in
power in Congress and would not consider increasing the exe-
cutive powers of a Republican president. The attention to
economy and efficiency lay dormant while the nation was
preoccupied with the events of Vorld War I.
The United States emerged from the war with considerably
increased spending and, what was considered at that time, a
tremendous public debt. Attention again was turned to finan-
cial management of the Government, culminating in the enactment
of the "Budget and Accounting Act of 1921". This act provided
for the executive budget which was to be consolidated into a
single document and presented by the President to Congress.
In financial matters the secretaries of departments and the
agency heads became agents of the President rather than agents
of the Congress. The departments were reouired to designate
budget officers to consolidate department budgets. The first
budget officer in the Navy Department was the Chief of Naval
Operations. Subsequently the office was filled by a line rear
admiral who reported directly to the Secretary. In 1941 this
officer was designated Director of Budget and Renorts.^ Thus
the Navy met the requirements of the executive budget, but
^Wra. Howard Taft, "The Need for a National Budget,"
Budgeting: An Instrument of Planning (Seckler-Kudson, Unit
No. 1), p. 80.
6
Frederick C. Mosher, Program Budgeting: Theory and
Practice (Public Administration Service, 1924), p. 55.

7budgeting and appropriations were still based on funding for
agencies and objects of expenditure. The Budget and Accounting
Act (1) created the Bureau of the Budget to assist the
President in his new budgetary responsibilities, and (2) the
General Accounting Office to enable Congress to keen a check
on Federal spending through the audit function vested in this
agency.
Between the passage of this act and the post World War
II era the trend toward centralization in executive budgetary
responsibility continued. By the Reorganization Act of 1939,
the Eureau of the Budget was removed from the Treasury Depart-
ment and placed in the new Executive Office of the President
created by this act. Government corporations were also brought
under closer executive supervision by the Corporation Control
Act of 19^5. However, aside from complying with executive
changes in budgetary procedures and methods no budgetary action
was taken which was of singular importance to the military.
At the close of World War II the nation found itself
again heavily in debt and committed to huge annual expenditures.
An inflationary influence on government spending was the
emergence of the United States as the leader of the "free
world" in its struggle to stave off the ambition of Russian
Communism for world dominance. As part of the "cold war"
strategy the United States began a program of aid, both military
and economic, to its allies and decided to keep a strong defen-
sive force of its own. Over half of the Federal budget was
now being devoted to security. Hence, with concern returning

8to economy and efficiency the focal point became the military
departments. Emphasis was first directed toward organization.
It was contended that with wars bein£ fought on a global
pattern the areas of missions and interests of the military
forces were overlapping. This engendered wasteful competition
and duplication of effort in the military. The arguments ranged
from the status quo to outright merger of the Armed Forces.
The result was the passage of the "national Security Act of
1947'.
This act provided for security planning on the highest
level through the National Security Council. The Air Force was
given autonomy and the three military Departments, Army, i^avy,
and Air Force, were constituted as the National Military
Establishment (NME), presided over by the Secretary of Defense
who was given cabinet status along with the Military Secretar-
ies. Provision was made for a continuation of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff which had operated so well during the war. This body
was legally constituted as comprising the three military
service chiefs who were provided a small Joint staff. The
principal duty of the Secretary of Defense and the boards
constituted in the NME was to ''coordinate" the efforts of the
military services. The major problem experienced with this
form of organization was that the powers of the Secretary were
rather vague and circumspect. He could neither inspire nor
force agreement among service elements; nor did he have the
staff necessary to carry out the coordination function. The
struggles of this period are vividly described in the Forres tal
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Diaries, which were published shortly after the tragic death
of the first Secretary of Defense, James V. Forrestal.
Although the National Security Act of 19^7 had little to say
on financial matters, the major squabbles associated with the
NME were the result of the service failures to resolve military
budget requests within ceilings set by the President.
The next step was to come with the enactment of the
"National Security .Act Amendments of 1949". Prior to enact-
ment of this legislation, in addition to the evidence of the
organizational unworkability of the 19^7 Act, the Congress had
before it the renorts of the First Hoover Commission. The
report of this group on budgeting and accounting had the
following first recommendation:
e recommend that the whole budgetary concept of the
Federal Government should be refashioned by the
adoption of a budget based upon functions, activities
and projects: this we designate as a "performance
budget"."
The term "performance (or program) budget", with the
prestige of the Hoover Commission behind it, took on an almost
magic appeal. It was also natural at this time that in con-
sidering a more efficient organization of the NME, the Congress
should consider its financial management as well. The National
Security Act Amendments, therefore, called for reform in both
7
James V. Forrestal, Forrestal Diaries (Mill is,
Alitor, Viking Press, 1951).
S
The Commission on Organization of the Executive
Branch of the Government (First Hoover Commission) report on
Budgeting and Accounting , Feb. 15, 19^9.
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organization and financial management. The first part of the
Act amended the 19^7 act in such a way as to place the
Secretary of Defense in line authority over the Military Estab-
lishment, which was designated the Department of Defense vice
the National Military Establishment. The Military Secretaries
were designated as such and removed from the cabinet status
accorded in the National Security Act of 19^7. The various
boards and committees of the Department of Defense were made
directly responsible to the Secretary of Defense. This official
was also given a larger staff to assist him. The Joint Chiefs
of Staff was also given a Chairman to preside over meetings,
fix agendas, and act as principal rrilitary advisor to the
Secretary of Defense and the President.
The second part of this Act added Title IV, for the
"Promotion of economy and efficiency through establishment of
uniform budgetary and fiscal procedures and organizations."
This Title provided for a Comptroller of the Department
of Defense whose duty was to supervise the Department in all
matters comprising the fiscal functions. The term of this
Act is "supervise" which connotes management responsibility
above mere "coordination". Comptroller organizations were
provided for each of the military departments. The military
department comptrollers were given responsibility for the
fiscal functions of their resoective departments under the
supervision afforded by the Controller of the Department of
Defence. Title IV then specified "performance budgeting" for
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the Department of Defense in the following terms:
The Budget estimates of the Department of Defense
shall be prepared, presented and Justified, where
practicable, and authorized programs shall be
administered in such form and manner as the Secretary
of Defense, subject to the authority and direction
of the President, may determine, so as to account
for and report the cost of performance of readily
identifiable functional programs and activities,
with separation of operating and capital programs.
So far as practicable, the budget estimates and
authorized programs of the military departments
shall be set forth in readily comparable form
and shall follow a uniform pattern.
9
After 160 years of budgeting by activity and object
of expenditure the Department of Defense was to budget for the
work to be done rather than the things to be acquired. Bud-
gets of the military departments were also to be comparable
and set forth in a uniform pattern. The trend toward uniform-
ity and centralized control was thus continued. In addition
the new philosophy of "the program" was interjected. Programs
could and did often cut across organizational lines.
In compliance with this law the Navy Office of Budget
and Reports became the Office of the Comptroller of the ;Cavy.
As a further step, Public Law 542, 83rd Congress provided for
the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Financial Kanagement
and his designation by the Secretary as Comptroller. His
Deputy Comptroller is a line rear admiral. The Navy also
recast its fiscal 1951 budget along program lines. However,
9
at Congress, 1st Session, PL 216, entitled,
"National Security Act Amendments of 1949."
83rd Congress, 2nd Session, PL 562, 1954.
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this recasting followed the existing organization structure
with "bureau" appropriations. In later years bureau appro-
priations were further refined to separate capital programs
from those of a current operations nature. The 1951 program
structure will be tabulated in the next chapter.
"The Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950"
extended performance budgeting to the rest of the government.
It also established guide lines for the Joint Accounting
Program which was headed by the General Accounting Office with
the participation of the Treasury department and the Bureau of
the Budget. This program was instituted to guide the intro-
duction and application of uniform accounting procedures in
the Federal Government.
The most recent act to date in the development of
federal budgeting is Public Law S63, passed in 1956 by the
84th Congress. This act calls for the development of cost-
based budgets as the basis for requests for appropriations and
the administration and operation of departments and their
subordinate units. These cost based budgets are to be facili-
tated by the adoption of accrual accounting by all governmental
units as soon as practicable. The act amended the Budget and
Accounting Procedures Act of 1950 to provide that heads of
executive agencies, in consultation with the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget, take action necessary to achieve as far
as possible: "(1) consistency in accounting and budgeting
classifications; (2) synchronization between accounting and

13
budget classifications and organizational structure, and
(3) support of the budget Justifications by information on
performance and program costs by organizational units,"
Through the years financing government has moved from
irresponsible fragmentation to closer executive control and
supervision. No longer does the independent bureau chief go
to Congress for his funds and administer expenditure of these
funds independently. His budget is no longer only a means to
appropriations but must also serve as a tool of control. The
Congress, with the support of the Executive, has expressed as
its sense, that budgeting must be based on sound accounting
procedures and the organizational structure must support both.
• emphasis must be on things to be done and not on things
to be bought . There must be uniformity between agencies and
comparability where practicable. All these budgetary concepts
have been introduced at an accelerating pace since the turn
of the century.
n84th Congress, 2nd Session, PL 863, 1956.

CHAPTER II
DEPA' :tal organization, abmx and navy
m
General
Figures II-l and II-2 show diagrammatically the
current organization 'of the Department of the Army and the
Department of the Navy and should be studied in conjunction
with the following discussion.
As was noted in the preceding chapter, the Navy recast
its 1951 budget to conform with program budgeting. Table II-l
indicates the appropriation titles under the old form of
object classification budget and the changes wrought by intro-
duction of the new performance budget. The net result was a
change from A3 appropriations to 19. The Army, however, went
from ?1 appropriation titles to S with the introduction of
performance budgeting. The difference can be accounted for In
the respective approaches of the Navy and Army to the require-
ments of performance budgeting as set forth in Public Law 216.
The Navy adjusted its programs to fit its bureau system and
to recognize bureau responsibility; the Army, through reorganiza-
tion, centralized its budgeting at the headquarters level. The
principal result of the separate approaches was that the Navy
budget became as functional as its bureau organization while
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APPROPRIATION TITLES FOR NAVY FISCAL 1951 BUDGET
OLD VS. NEW
OLD TITLE NEW TITLE
Office of the Secretary:
iscellaneous Expenses
Contingencies of the* Navy
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technical services. The Air Force, on the other hand, had no
problem of legislated or traditional organization. When the
Air Force was given separate status by the National Security
Act of 1947, it was organized with central control vested in
the headquarters staff. In this respect, and probably because
of strong Array influence, the headquarters organization of these
two services is quite similar. Budgeting and appropriation
control is centralized in the General and Air Staffs.
The Army Organization
Writing concerning the results of the National Security
Act Amendments of 19^9, General '.. B. Palmer, a former Vice Chief
of Staff, stated, "Congress took control of money away from the
bureaus and placed it in the hands of the Secretary of the Army.
This was the most important change ever made in the administra-
tion of the Army with the sole exception of the General Staff
law itself/' 12
This statement is true because of the manner in which
the Army reorganized and by virtue of the subordinate position
of the Chief of Staff to the Secretary of the Army. The General
Staff concept provides for direct line authority from the
?retary of the Army through the Under Secretary to the Chief
of Staff. The Chief of Staff is responsible for the administra-
tion of the Army. He carries out the administration of the
Army through his deputies and assistants who answer directly to
him. Appropriation administration is handled by the Deputy
Chiefs of Staff with the coordination and technical guidance
1?
Gen. V;. B. Palmer, "The General Staff, U. S. Army"
(Armed Forces anagement , October 1957), p. 10.
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of the Comptroller of the Army, who has Deputy Chief of Staff
status as the result of the last General Staff reorganization
In 1956. The seven technical services which had enjoyed con-
siderable autonomy and were responsible for handling their
separate appropriations, are now under the Deputy Chief of
Staff for Logistics.
With the exception of the Assistant Secretary of the
Army (Financial Management), the Army civilian assistants do
not exercise direct line authority. • Comptroller of the
Army is under the direction and supervision of, and is directly
responsible to, the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial
Management), by delegation of the Secretary of the Army. The
Comptroller of the Army is concurrently responsible to the
Chief of Staff. !,13
The unique position of the Assistant Secretary of the
Army (Financial Management) was dictated by the requirements of
Public Law 216. The only other direct relationship specified
between a civilian assistant and the General Staff is that of
the Assistant Secretary of the Army, (Logistics) and the Deputy
Chief of Staff for Logistics. The Deputy Chief of Staff for
Logistics is under the ''functional supervision" of The Assistant
Secretary of the Army (Logistics), but he is under the direct
supervision and control of the Chief of Staff.
Thus direction and supervision of the Army in all its
aspectB emanates from the General Staff. In effect the civilian
13
Army Regulation No. 10-5 "Organization and
Functions, Department of the Army."
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hierarchy has been superimposed on the military staff and
takes effect through the medium of this group.
The Navy Organization
To distinguish it from the Army, the Navy is said to
have 'horizontal'' organization at opposed to the "vertical"
hierarchy of the Army. Below the level of the Secretary of the
Navy, control in the Wavy is divided horizontally among the
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), the Under Secretary of the
Navy and the Commandant of the Marine Corps.
To facilitate understanding of the Mary organization,
control will he discussed in the light of the four principal
tasks, evolved in the division of authority in the Navy. These
tasks are: (1) policy control, (2) naval command, (3) logis-
tic administration and control, and, (4) business administra-
tion. lA
1. The task of policy control is the interpretation,
application and upholding of national policies as they apply to
the development and use of the Navy. Since he has the respon-
sibility for the results and efforts of the entire Navy Depart-
ment, the Secretary of the Navy has retained policy control as
his prime interest. In the formulation and administration of
policy he draws on the advice and assistance of his chief
executive assistants.
2. Responsibility for naval command has been assigned
to the Chief of Laval Operations except in areas in which the
1 4
"How the Department of the Navy is Organized,"
Armed Forces Management ., November 1957 » p. 76.
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task of command 1b reserved to the Commandant of the Marine
Corps. The Commandant of the Marine Corps is responsible to
the Chief of Maval Operations for the readiness and performance
of Marine Corps elements assigned to the operating elements
of the Navy. Such Marine elements assigned are under command
of the Chief of Naval Operations. In executing the command
task, the Chief of :;aval Operations is responsible to the
Secretary for the command administration and use of the Opera-
ting Forces of the Navy. The Chief of .."aval Operations is the
.al Command Assistant, while the Commandant of the Marine
Corps is titled the Marine Corps Command Assistant.
3. The task of logistic administration and control
is that of coordinating and directing the efforts of the Navy
nartment and the Shore Establishment in order to assure the
development, procurement, production and distribution of
material, facilities and personnel to the Operating Forces.
Responsibility for logistic administration and control has been
divided between the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant
of the Marine Corps and the civilian assistants
.
The Chief of Biaval Operations has been charged with
the responsibility for: (1) planning, forecasting and deter-
mining the requirements of the Operating; Forces for material,
facilities, and personnel; (2) coordinating the efforts of the
bureaus and offices of the Navy department as necessary to
effectuate availability and distribution of these requirements;
(3) issuing statements of requirements to the bureaus and
offices and reviewing and analyEing progress in fulfilling
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these requirements} (A) collaborating with the civilian
assistants in fulfilling requirements of the Operating Forces
and in evaluating and strengthening the procedures governing
the determination of requirements; and (5) coordinating and
integrating the requirements of the Operating Forces, the
Marine Corps and the bureaus and offices of the Navy Department
into total requirements of the Department.
With the exception of step (5) above the Commandant
of the Marine Corps is responsible for Marine Corps logistics
to an extent similar to that of the Chief of Naval Operations
for Operating Force logistics.
The civilian executive assistants under the Under
Secretary of the Navy are responsible for the remaining facets
of logistic administration and control. The bureaus and offices
of the Mavy Department, and through them the Shore Kstablishment,
are under the direct control of the civilian assistants. The
control of these executives is most apparent in procurement,
production and financing of logistic requirements. As an over-
simplification but as an aid to understanding, naval logistics
may be divided into two segments: (1) consumer logistics under
the aegus of the Chief of Naval Operations; and (2) producer
logistics presided over by the Under Secretary of the Navy.
4. The task of business administration is that of
business management to attain economy and efficiency with
particular regard to matters of organization, staffing, admin-
istrative nrocedures, budgeting and the expenditure of funds.

23
The civilian executive assistants have responsibility for
business administration throughout the Navy Department and the
Shore Establishment and collaborate with and assist the Chief
of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps in
evaluating and improving business administration with respect
to other components of the Department of the Navy under their
command.
As an example of control of business administration in
the Navy, the following citation of the Comptroller's position
is submitted:
The Comptroller of the Navy's authority and
responsibility in financial matters is exercised
primarily through the medium of technical control.
The term "technical direction" is one which is
peculiar to the Navy and means the specialized or
professional guidance and direction exercised by
an authority of the Naval Establishment in technical
matters. • • . Instructions and directives are Issued
through established organizational or command lines.
This is in accordance with accepted differentiation
in the Navy between technical control and command
or management control. 15
The Navy bureaus and offices are directly responsible
for the commitment, obligation and expenditure of funds made
available to them through apportionments and allocations. The
Comptroller operates by review and control techniques and through
established command channels over the decentralized financial
operations.
Summary
The discussion in this chapter has brought out the
15 Ibid., p. 26.
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strong central control pattern of the Army General Staff
system and the decentralized organization for control of the
Navy Department. Both are rooted in tradition and historical
development. The General Staff, with its single line authority
tends toward rigidity of control. Reorganization was necessary
in the *rmy to incorporate the Comptroller and accommodate the
comptrollershlp concept at the headquarters echelon. On the
other hand, the Navy ^Department, with its divisions of
functional control, accommodated the comptrollershlp organiza-
tion and concept within its existing structure. To the laymen,
the Navy organization may appear particularly complex and to
defy all the management rules for good organization. Successful
administration of the Navy under this division of control has
probably been the result of a tacit acceptance of the separa-
tion of military command and business management by all
echelons, both civilian and military. It would seem that the
civilian assistants are much more influential in the administra-
tion of the Navy Department than in the Army but the power of
the Chief of Naval Operations must not be minimized when
compared to the Chief of Staff of the Army. In the area of
logistic control and administration, the planning, coordination
and integration functions of the CNO cut across all lines of
direct control.
In addition to the formal structures of the Departments
presented here, there are many formal boards and committees in
both services which effect coordination and a cross fertiliza-
tion of ideas and positions. There is also the immeasurable
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effect of the Informal day-to-day contacts between individuals
of different offices and echelons of control, llo brief
discussion of a formal organizational structure can cover all
the factors contributing to the actual operation of any
organization, but the skeletal structures and organizational
philosophies have been covered in this chapter.

CHAPTER III
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, NAVY
Introduction
The title of this chapter is that of a Navy appropria-
tion and has been chopen for discussion because it is an
anomaly when considered in the light of the Navy bureau- type
appropriation structure. The research and development appro-
priation is service-wide and programs of all the bureaus in
this area are funded through it. There are two other service-
wide appropriations, Service-Wide Supply and Finance, Navy,
and Service-. ide Operations, Navy, but these present no incon-
sistency with the normal pattern. The Bureau of Supplies and
Accounts is responsible for the service wide supply and finance
appropriation which funds elements which have always been con-
sidered within the purview of the Supply Corps. The service-
wide operations appropriation funds miscellaneous programs and
activities which could not be considered to be of single
bureau interest. Many CNO and Secretary of the Navy activities,
such as the Hydrogr?phic Office and congressional travel, are
funded under this title. The responsibility for this appro-
priation rests in the Administrative Office of the Secretary.
Research and development then is unique among the




been the cause of much realignment of organization and control.
Indeed, the period of adjustment in organization has even
yet not run its course.
Development of the Budget
During V/orld V/ar II the scientific resources of the
country were mobilized through the Office of Scientific Research
and Development (OSRQ) under the direction of Dr. Vannevar
Bush. It was through this Office that the civilian scientists
presented their ideas to the military and the military presented
their problems to the scientists. Through the impetus of war
the closest of coordination was achieved, with the Manhatten
Project, the proximity fuse and other new weapons standing as
objective evidence. At the end of the war many feared that
to the detriment of the nation, this coordination would be lost.
These persons also felt that the military, left to pursue their
immediate problems of application, would forget basic research
since it has no particular military end product in mind. Dr.
Bush was an able spokesman for this group before Congress,
through the press and in his many writings.*" The result was
that research captured the imagination of the public, Congress
and elements in the Executive Branch and there was a determina-
tion to see that research was given its rightful place in the
military and its appropriate share of military funds.
In keeping with the atmosphere of the times the
16
Vannevar Bush, "Military Organization for the
United States" (Washington 1946), p. 4.
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Secretaries of v.'ar and Navy chartered the Joint Research and
Development Board (JRDB) on June 6, 1946. This group was to
coordinate the research effort of the Army and NaT/ and
succeeded the wartime OSRD, Dr. Bush was appointed first
chairman of the Board, what coordination was effected was by
consent since the Board held no real line authority. Of more
interest to the Navy was the legislation creating the Office
17
of Naval Research (OK,R) "by Congress in this same year. The
Office of Naval Research, headed by the Chief of Naval Research
who was given equal status with the bureau chiefs, was
established to encourage scientific research in augmentation
of the programs engaged in by the various bureaus and to
coordinate the Navy research effort. Congress further provided
in this Act for the appropriation funding of ONR and thus the
first separate research appropriation and supporting budget
was developed in the Navy. The other bureaus, however, con-
tinued funding their research through their many appropriation
titles.
The next major step in the centralization of control
over research came in 19^7 with the enactment of the National
Security ^ct. This act abolished the JRDB and consolidated
its personnel into a new Research and Development Board (RDB)
which was a part of the National military Establishment.
Although this Board was again chiefly limited to coordination
17
79th Congress, 2nd Session, PL 588, 1946.
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and was to ''advice" the Secretary of Defense, Congress also
provided that It would prepare an integrated program of
research and development for the military. *® There was consid-
erable discussion in the Navy at the time as to Just what form
this integrated program would take. The area of discussion
resolved into three possibilities:
(1) A single research and development budget and
appropriation for the NME,
(2) a single appropriation for each department within
an overall NME budget, or
(3) limitations placed on research and development
items in each appropriation In accordance with
an overall NME budget.
Of course, any cf these approaches would limit the
freedom and autonomy of each military department in the R&D
area. The generally accepted ilavy position was that a single
budget would not be appropriate inasmuch as R&D within the
military services and their component organizations was so
closely allied with the operating function that the funds should
be maintained in the budgets as then constituted. It was argued
that the military services have ultimate responsibility in their
respective military fields for the defense of the nation and
its policies and to meet these responsibilities must have the
18
o
"National Security Act of 1947."
•°Oth Congress, 1st Session, PL 253, 1947.
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initiative for Planning all their operations. Setting a
fixed amount for any program, such as research and development,
would produce a lack of balance in the total service program.
The absorption of budget cuts from whatever source should be
the responsibility of the services since the overall respon-
sibility for readiness is theirs.
The new Air Force initiated its appropriation structure
with a single service-wide research and development budget and
appropriation, but the :;avy, having successfully defended its
position, continued with its existing appropriation structure.
The RDB encountered considerable difficulty in com-
paring separate services coets for research and development
items and determining Just what constituted the total effort
in this area. Programs and funds moved in and out of the
research area. This was not only true of Navy multiple
appropriations but items could be shifted among appropriations
within a military department by a change in definition during
budget formulation. This problem is extant today, particularly
as to when an item moves from research and development to
procurement. The RDB set forth definitions, arranged categories
and specified formats to enable them to view the research and
development effort through reports submitted by the services.
Thus, it became necessary for the services to segregate the
R&D items from other program and budget areas for separate
reporting to RDB.
In an attempt to get a better look at research and
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development the Congress decreed in both the National Security
Act Amendments of 19^9 and the Department of Defense Appro-
priation Act for fiscal 1950 that no funds were to be
obligated by any department or agency of the Department of
Defense for research and development except in accordance with
regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Oefense. To meet
the requirements of these laws the Secretary of Defense began
the issuance of a ' Schedule of Programmed Obligations" which
set forth target figures of obligations for budget programs.
These figures were not to be exceeded by more than 10
without a reprogramming authorization of this Department.
The Research and Development Board recommended these obliga-
tion limitations to the Secretary of Defense based on approved
military department programs. The Secretary of the Navy also
exempted research and develooment funds from the 5% flexibility
privilege allowed in the case of other appropriated funds.
This privilege allows the transfer of up to 5% of funds into
and out of budget activities (first sub-division of an appro-
priation) without prior approval of the Secretary. ^ The
Navy Director of Budget and Reports further informed the bureau
and office chiefs that because of the closer Secretary of Defense
control of R & D funds, and because of difficulty in the past in
developing consistent data, it had become increasingly appa-
rent that research and development amounts should be specifically
Navy Comptroller •« Manual, Vol, 6, Para. 061101.
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identified in budget estimation and execution.
Responding to the pressure for identification and
scrutiny of research and development funds, and in consonance
with the new performance budget concept, the Army shifted to
a service-wide research and development budget for fiscal year
1952. At that time the RDB wished to set up a standard report-
ing format but the Navy objected because the particular pro-
posal would not accommodate the Navy Bureau appropriation
structure.
In 1953 the ROB was abolished and its duties and
responsibilities transferred directly to the Secretary of
Defense.
^
U The Secretary appointed an Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Research and development) to exercise the functions
previously under RDB« (Later the titles and functions of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (R <£ D), and those of the
Assistent Secretary of Defense (Engineering) were merged under
a single Assistant Secretary of Defense, Research and Englneer-
?1lug)* These moves continued the advance toward firmer central
control and segregation of research and development from
other appropriation items.
The next year, 1954, in acting on the fiscal 1955
appropriation act, Congress forced the Navy into a service-wide
20
Reorganization Plan uo. 6 of 1953.
21D0D Directive 5121.9 of ; arch 18, 1957,




appropriation by consolidating all Navy research and develop-
ment under one appropriation title with the following proviso
in the appropriation:
Provided: That the unexpended balances
appropriated for research and development under the
he ds "Naval Personnel, General Expenses", "Marine
Corps, Troops and Facilities", "Aircraft and Facilities",
"Ships and facilities", "Ordnance and Facilities",
"jiedlcal Care", "Civil Engineering", 'Service ^id*
Supply and Finance, Navy" for the fiscal years 19 r 3
tad 195^ and the unexpended balance of appropriations
under the head "Research" are hereby transferred to
and merged with* this appropriation, in such amounts
as may be recommended by the Secretary of Defense and
apnroved by the Director of the Bureau of the Bud-
get. . . , 22
The reason for this action was to facilitate uniformity
and comparability among the services. In the words of the
Senate Appropriations Committee, "... If the Navy is to
carry out its program In a manner similar to that planned for
the other services . . ."is expressed in the meaning of
this action.^ ThUB it was the Congress which took the final
action and breached the Kavy's tradition of decentralized
bureau budget responsibility.
Administration of the Budget
The problem facing the Navy Department was that of
controlling the budgeting and funding associated with a new
appropriation which did not specifically belong in any one
22
83rd Congress, 2nd Session PL 458 entitled:
"Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1955."
23
'Senate Coanittee on AoT>ror)riations reoort
No. 1582 of June 11, 1954.

34
bureau. Because of prior pressures, research and development
had been organizationally segregated in the bureaus and was
funded under an activity heading in their various apnroprla-
tions so these activities would form a base for the new
appropriation, but they had to be brought together in a central
office. Placing such responsibility with C$0 would disrupt
the Mavy pattern of separation of military command, «*r^d
business administration; nor was the Assistant Secretary of
the Navy for Air, traditionally charged with Navy H & D
matters, staffed to handle this task. L'ince ONP's 19^6
charter called for coordination of research, this agency was
the logical center for the service wide budget.
In June 195^ the Tocretary of the Navy assigned
to the Chief of Naval Research the additional respon-
sibility of coordinating the development phase of
applied Research and Development. For the first time
a central point was established for the technical
coordination of the many development programs carried
on by the bureaus. It also meant that the coordination
of research and development was to be formalized and
intensified. The overall coordination responsibility
is carried but in ONR through a Director of Research
Coordination and a development coordinator. 2^
ONR was designated as "responsible bureau'' for the
research and development appropriation and was to administer
the appropriation In accordance with uniform program structure
and standard budget and expense accounting clsssifications set
by the Secretary of Defense. ^
2 Rear Adro. Rawson Bennett, "How Navy Research Will
Operate, ' Armed forces; Management . Jan. 1958.
5NAVC0RP Inst. 7000. 9A of June 18, 1955. "Appropria-
tion, Research and Development, Navy, Administration of."
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Note that th-^ term "technical coordination" is used
in the above quotation concerning ONR*s position. This
implies something less than complete control or authority.
The ONR position Is further clarified in another statement by
Admiral Bennett:
In Its coordination of research OKR's basic
policy has always been to avoid the establishment
of rigid, formal machinery for coordinating and
planning. Its purpose is, rather, to provide the
means for inter-bureau and inter-laboratory groups
to get together/ It moves into technical areas that
appear critical to the Navy, and into warfare areas
where the work appears to require integration. 2"
In funding the R&D appropriation, the restriction
of the 5% flexibility provision mentioned earlier still
applies. The Secretary of the Navy allocates R&D funds to
the bureaus via ONR on an activity basis. Although NAVCOMPT
Instruction 7000. 9A provide that reimbursement residue over
anticipated requirements would be subject to apportionment
and allocation on a basis of need, regardless of activity
generating the reimbursement collection, little attempt has
been made to move funds from one budget activity to another.
The bureau budget activities have become about as sacrosanct
as the Independent bureau appropriations.
It is in the area of planning the logistic require-
ments, as set forth in Chapter II, that the Chief of Naval
Operations enters the research and development field. Since
Rear Adm. Rawson Bennett, "Office of Naval
Research," Armed Forces Management . November 1951, p. 37.
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a "budget is a plan of operations expressed in financial terms
the CNO has very definite budgetary interests in programming
and guiding R&D expenditures. This paper is principally
concerned with budgeting, but since planning and budgeting are
intimately linked a brief word concerning planning is In
order.
Briefly, planning and budgeting follow the same general
channels, and with the exception of certain specifically finan-
«
cial functions, the same individuals of the various agencies
are involved in both processes. The problems that beset the
budgetary process are also applicable to the planning process.
Planning is usually thought of in its long range aspects;
however, it not only precedes budgeting but runs concurrently
with it. Plans must be adjusted to come within the budget
figures as they are evolved. Budgeted funds muet be shifted
to meet new situations produced by planning. The whole is a
continuing nrocess, indivisible with no clear beginning or end.
The total process produces two documents applicable to a fiscal
year for R&D: First, the Navy Research and Development
Program which eventually goes to the Assistant Secretary of
Defense (R&D) and forms the basis for the Schedule of
Programmed Obligations, and second, the avy Research and
Development Budget which goes to the Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Comptroller) for incorporation with other Department
27
of Defense budgets. It is not meant to be implied here that
27SECNAV Inst. 3910. 1A of April 19, 1957, "Research
and Development Planning and Management Procedures."
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there are no deadline dates or divisions in processing these
documents, but the reader is advised to view the dynamicism
of the processes rather than to try to segregate various
steps. Because of this dynamicism and the time differentials
in flow patterns the two documents seldom agree in their final
form. Figure III- (Lines of Authority and Administration in
the Navy's Research and Development Program) and Figure III-2
(Flow chart of Research and Development Functions) give a
simplified picture of the overall R&D process.
The CNO budget responsibilities rest in a review of
the program transmitted from ONR, This program should reflect
the overall planning and program objectives expressed by
CNO at earlier dates. The chief medium for CNO review is the
Navy Research and Development Review Board (NRDRB) whose mem-
bership is comprised of the heads of the various warfare
divisions of CNO, the Chief of ::aval Research and a represen-
tative of the Commandant of the Marine Corps. CNO's major
problem with this board has been to brin? objectivity to the
Navy R&D program and budget. The program and supporting
budget as received by CNO and the l.avy Comptroller represent
the parochial approach of the bureaus and do not always reflect
the paramount interest of the Navy as a whole.
Among steps recently taken to integrate Navy R&D
have been the " Weapons systems concept' and the "Lead Bureau
Concept" inaugurated in the past two years. Under the Lead
Bureau Concept approved by the Secretary of the Navy in
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August 1957, one bureau is assigned full technical and
budgetary responsibility for a weapons or support system.
This bureau in turn contracts with the other bureaus for
their contribution toward the particular program. The Lead
Bureau Concept evolved in implementation of the weapons
system planning to be carried out by CNO. A 1956 discussion
of the Weapons System Concept had the following indictment
of Navy wide R & D planning:
It is essential to the formulation of sound
long range goals that there be an agency within
OPNAV capable of conceiving, in general physical
terms new and Improved weapons systems and weapons
system complexes by which these goals may be
realized. This group should approach the problems
from the viewpoint of the entire field of naval
warfare rather than from the restricted viewpoint
of the present warfare desks. 28
Thus the warfare divisions of OPNAV are accused of
bringing a myopic viewpoint to the NRDRB. Certain of the
warfare divisions have interests that closely parallel the
interests of a particular bureau and hence bring that bureau's
viewpoint to the fore in NRDRB meetings. Questions are then
resolved in this grout) by vote.
A continuing stream of minor shifts in internal
organization and division of responsibility within OPNAV has
taken place in recent years in an effort to attain objectivity
and strengthen CNO's position in integrating and coordinating
the research and development prop-ram. For example, the chair-
man of the NRDRB in 1952 was the Assistant Chief of Naval
OPNAV Notice 3300 of July 6, 1956, '..eapons System
Concept—Basis of Future Navy Development."
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Operations for Readiness who was under the Deputy Chief of
Naval Operations for Fleet Operations and Readiness. Somewhat
later the title of the latter officer was changed by the
addition of "and Research and Development " and he took the
chair; in the last year the chairmanship has been vested with
the new Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Research and
Development.
The creation of the position of ACNO for R&D repre-
sents a new concentration of research and development respon-
sibility closer to the CNO. The AC MO (R&D) is directly
answerable to CNO on research and development matters. Although
this officer and his staff are currently onerating without an
approved charter, they are gradually taking over from the
warfare divisions certain R&D functions, particularly of a
systems naturr. Perhaps with a centralization of R & D
matters in this new office, which is not encumbered with other
matters as are the other offices and divisions of OPWAV, a
more objective view of R & D will be realized, This should
result in greater Integration and coordination of the Navy
research and development program.
With the institution of these latest changes in OPNAV
it is planned that the annual research and development program
and budget flow will be about as follows
:
1. The developing agencies, in response to the annual
nrogram objectives promulgated by CNO, will nrepare their
budgets for submission to ONR in the format prescribed by the
CNR. The budgets will be consolidated and summarized by ONR.
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2. On a date prescribed by CNO, prior to submission
of the total budget to the Navy Comptroller, the consolidated
project listing (Program) will be forwarded to the ACNO
(R ft D).
3. Upon receipt of the program, the ACNO (R&D)
will distribute it to all OPNAV divisions for review and
comment.
4. Upon receipt of comments the ACNO (R&D) will
prepare a coordinated program which will include:
a, projects in support of systems and equipment
required by CNO and the Commandant of the Marine
Corps, listed in order of priority;
b. projects required to support basic research,
supporting research and technical tests and
evaluation;
d. recommended distribution of funds based on
assignment of projects to responsible developing
agencies and compiled to permit adjustments to
varying funding levels as the budget is evolved.
5. The correlated program will be submitted to the
NRDRB for review and development of a recommended program.
6. The resulting annual Department of the Navy R&D
program will then be submitted to the Navy Comptroller in
time to conform with his call for the budget estimates (about
2 July annually). Conies of the program will be sent to the
developing bureaus.
7. Review and mark-up of the budget, submitted in
response to the call for the estimates, by the Navy Comptroller




8. Upon approval by CNO the R & D "budget will be
forwarded with the total Navy budget to the Secretary of the
Navy for his review, action and transmittal to the Secretary
of Defense,
9. Further recommendations for significant changes
in the approved R&D programs will be coordinated by the
ACNO (R & D). 29
If the above procedures and timing can be accomplished
there will certainly be better integration of the R&D
effort, particularly in the relation of programming to budget-
ing. However, the bureau pressures and the various pressures
within OPNAV are still extant. Coordinating these diverse
interests will require a strong hand on the part of the ACNO
(R&D) and the closest attention of the Chief of Naval
Operations.
In this discussion of the administration of the
service-wide R&D budget and appropriation , an attempt has
been made to show the struggle to give central direction and
control to the Navy R&D effort. To date there has been no
agency or office in the Navy Department with sufficient author-
ity or singleness of purpose to control and direct the total
research and development effort. The creation of the office
of ACNO (R & D) is the latest step to bring the service-wide
objective view to bear in this area. If this step is not
290PNAV Inst. 3900. --(to be issued)




satisfactory perhaps R&D will be raised to the DCNO level
in OPNAV. However, unlike the complete supervision of
R&D exercised by the Chief of Research in the Army, this
officer in CNO would not exercise direct control over
funding under present iiavy organization concepts.
Coordination and integration of the R & D budget for
the most part takes place within the agencies and procedures
discussed. The Kavv Comptroller is concerned chiefly with
the financial technicalities and Justification of projects in
the light of economy and efficiency. The CNO Advisory Board
and the Research and Development Committee of the Secretary
of the Navy (Air) sometimes act in an appeals capacity or
settle questions which remain unresolved Just prior to
transmittal of the Navy budget to DOD.
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CHAPTER IV
TOWARD A SERVICE-WIDE OPERATIONS AND
'UNTENANCE BUDGET
In Chapter III the successive steps leading toward
the service-wide appropriation, Research and Development,
Navy, were traced. It was inevitable that matters in this
dynamic field should be the first to come to the fore in the
drive toward uniformity in the financing structure of the
military departments. The changes wrought have brought the
research and development budgets and appropriations of the
three military departments into virtually the same pattern and
format throughout. "This overall trend of closer coordination
and liaison has helped the Department of Jefense in administer-
ing the research and development programs of all three services.
It has also helped us to achieve interservice coordination in
30general and effective unification."
However this same trend has caused the Navy the many
problems of control noted, because of its organizational philo-
sophy and its traditional and legislated organization structure.
The problems become even more acute when extended to other
30
Rear Adm. Rawson Bennett, How Navy Research and





than research and development areas.
The Department of Defense and the Bureau of the
Budget in their joint review consider budgetary matters under
eight headings (Budget Categories):
Military Personnel
Operations and maintenance






The budgets of the military departments are recast for review
to conform to this structure. Although no department appro-
priation structure follows these DOD categories completely,
the Army and lr Force structures are close to conformity
while the Navy structure is considerably at variance. Navy
conformance is limited to Research and Development and .orking
Capital Funds. The latter, once established, are not subject
to continuing appropriation action. Thus, being rather fixed
in nature and governed by the specifics of a charter in each
instance, they have caused the Navy little administrative
trouble.
Hardly had the Navy been brought to the single R & D
appropriation when there was introduced the next action toward
bringing the Navy into conformity with DOD concepts. Under
date of November 27, 1954, in a staff analysis on the 1956
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budget estimates of the Navy, the Joint Secretary of Defense
and Bureau of the Budget staff recommended a major change
in the Navy budget structure. The recommendation provided for
the consolidation of separate maintenance and operations
appropriations as follows:
Current Navy Appropriation: Proposed:




Civil Engineering Maintenance and
Service-* ide Supply and Finance Operations, Navy.
Service-wide Operations
The old appropriations were to become activities under
the new appropriation. Under this alignment the bureaus would
loee not only nominal control of parts of an appropriation, as
was the case with R & D, but responsibility for a complete
appropriation. The new activity titles could only be con-
sidered as interim since they would not accomplish the purpose
of uniformity and comparability and were not in conformity with
the DOD & M structure. It was therefore agreed between the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and Assistant
Secretary of the Mavy (Financial Management) that pursuit of
this proposal would be postponed. However, it was agreed to
present to Congress a new general procurement appropriation
proposal, comprised of items winnowed from the & M areas.
The Navy Sub-Committee of the House Appropriations Committee
disagreed with the proposed structure so the Department of
Defense Appropriation Act for fiscal year 1956 restored the
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original Mavy appropriation structure.
the Bureau of the Budget and DOD continued to press
for a single Q&M budget and appropriation. After much
discussion between authorities of these agencies and the Navy
it was proposed that; (a) the Navy retain its individual
0&,»> appropriations; and (b) that the internal structures of
these appropriations be changed to conform to the DOD structure
for O&M appropriations. To meet the provisions of this
proposal, the Navy Comptroller issued an instruction (in
November 1957) which called for a submission of dummy fiscal
1959 budgets under the new structure for the following
appropriations
:
Navy, Personnel, General Expenses
Marine Corps Troops and Facilities
Aircraft and Facilities, Navy
Ships and Facilities, Wavy
Ordnance and Facilities, Navy
Medioal Care, Navy
Civil Engineering, Navy
Service-Wide Supply and Finance, Navy.
The dummy appropriation structures were then to be cleared
with DOD and BuEud authorities and later presented to the
Military Appropriations Subcommittee of the House Appropriations
Committee for approval at special hearings for this purpose.
The required new structure was limited to the appropriation
activity level, calling for the following activity titles:
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Combat Forces, Training Activities, Central Supply Activities,
. ajor Overhaul and Maintenance of Material, Medical Activities,
Reserve Training, Department-wide Activities, Special
Materiel Support and Joint Projects. The job of the bureaus
was to merge about 54 old activity titles and the project
thereunder into the nine new activities. The bureaus and
offices were enjoined to give careful consideration to their
organizational structure in the process.
The overall budget structure (appropriations) of
the 1-isvy has been developed on organizational lines in
accordance with the performance budget concept. The
Navy bureaus and offices and the arine Corps each
administer and are responsible for appropriations
which support missions and programs within their
normal fields of endeavor except for minor deviations.
Improved financial management and self interest require
that this alignment be duplicated in the internal bureau
organizations. Fund administration should be lodged in
that organizational component which directs the mission
or program performed. This does not infer that internal
budget structures will dictate organizational structure,
but, rather that proDer organizational structure will
Include the element of budget execution; that, just as
a bureau chief has been delegated the responsibility for
the performance of overall missions or functions which
is reinforced with responsibility for administration and
control of appropriation support, the division and dele-
gation of these mission and program responsibilities
should be accompanied by division and delegation of
responsibility for budget execution. The opportunity
available under this instruction to concurrently improve
and align organizational and budget structures should
receive careful study by action addressees.
^
The submissions of the bureaus and offices in response
to the Navy Comptroller's instruction proved to be not entirely
satisfactory to the representatives of BuBud and DOD. Conse-
quently the Navy Comptroller called for a resubmission of the
31
NAVCOMP Inst. 7110.21 of ^ov. 22, 1957, "Revision
of Navy Operation and Maintenance Appropriation Structures."
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fiscal 1959 budget after bureau personnel h ;.:d consulted with
Navy Comptroller budget analysts who were aware of the areas
of difference and could aid In placing the resubmlttals In
acceptable forrc.^2
In the meantime a proposed directive of the DOD
concerning financial management in the area of appropriations
for operations and maintenance was issued for service comment
on February 6, 1953, certain features of which were in contra-
diction of past agreements. To these the Wavy took exception.
In view of the apparent impasse, it was agreed that implementa-
tion of a revised structure for Department of the Navy & H
appropriations should await the issuance of the proposed DOD
Directive and that this would preclude submission of the
fiscal I960 budget in a revised format.
The draft directive stated as DOD policy: "There
should be only one operation and maintenance appropriation
for each military department. "^*
The Navy Comptroller's reply to this statement was
as follows:
The proposal that the Department of the Navy have
a 8 ingle operations and maintenance appropriation
has been discussed exhaustively. It Is our understanding
that the senior echelons in the Bureau of the Budget
and the Department of Defense have recognized that
52NAVCOMPT Notice 7110 of March 7, 1958, "Revision
of the Department of the Navy Operation and Maintenance
Appropriation structures."
33
Proposed DOD Directive . . . "Program for Improvement
in Financial Management in the Area of Appropriations for
Operations and Maintenance" under draft of Feb. 6, 1958.
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ry'i organisational structure requires the
continuance of its several & M appropriations.
The statement of policy (above) serves no immediate
purpose and will only lend to prolong an argument
that can only be solved by a complete reorganization
of the Department of the Navy ... an action which
is beyond the purview of the proposed directive .34
da directive also proposed that conformity In the
military C & M appropriations be had at what the Navy calls
the project level (sub-head under "activity'' ) . If the Navy
were to maintain nine <Sb X appropriations this would mean
that the bureaus vould have to raerse about 270 projects under
81 new headings and these in turn under nine activities . This
would pose a tremendous administrative burden on the bureaus.
If the Navy is to be forced into a single & M
budget the major problem will be determination of the adminleter
ing agency— the Chief of liaval Operations, the Chief of Naval
rteriel, or some other agency. In any event a change in Navy
organizational philosophy and come new legislation would be
reouired. Trie office of Naval Research proved a convenient
centralization point for R&D matters with legislated author-
ity provided in its charter. It makes interesting conjecture
as to what the Navy would have done had ONR not been in exist-
ence in 195^ • It was only eight years old then. The i
appropriation situation is vastly more complicated. The
activity breakdown does not fit the bureau structure. The
funds Involved and activities financed are much greater than
34 Comptroller of the Navy letter to the Assistant
Secretary of Defense of April 2. 1958.
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those for R A D. A further laportant factor to be considered
vis-a-vis a Dingle & K budget la Impl events tion of Public
Law 663 which stater;
In order to hava a simplified systeT for
administration sub-division of appropriations or
funds, each agency shall work toward the objective
of financing each ooerating unit at the highest
practical level, fro?r not BOM than one administrative
subdivisionfor each appropriation or fund affecting
such unit. 5-
Under full and literal interpretation of this
provision of lav, atiny activities of the shore establishment
and many CUO field activities would be funded directly by the
agency responsible for the fervice- wide &. M appropriation.
55P. L. 863, op. cit.

CHAPTER V
SVUttiKS ^!T ~ COKCLUFICv-.
Economy and Efficiency
In Chapter I was followed the milestones along the
road to closer control and supervision in Federal financial
management. The actions of the Congress and the Executive
were taken in the interest of economy and efficiency. I feel
that in so inextricably linking these two words there is a
basic fallacy which must be guarded against in appraising the
worth of any action taken under this guise. The terms are not
synonymous, nor are they always complementary. For example:
the greatest measure of efficiency in a fighting force is
morale. Since the military pay represents about 25^ of the
military budget we can affect economy by refusing pay increases.
However, it can be presumed that such a measure would have a
deleterious effect on military morale. In fact, if pay
policies became sufficiently niggardly we would have at best
a lowering of the quality of personnel in the A.rmed Forces and
at worst a resort to compulsion to keep personnel on the rolls.
About the only meaningful relationship between economy and
efficiency is that a unit that is efficient is usually economi-




Closer aentrel and supervision has led to centralization
of budgeting and fundirr-, ore supervision leads to wore
supervisory 1-vels. The Budget end Accounting Act of 1921
added the Bureau of the 3udf?rt and the General Accounting
Office. i KfttlQsuO -eurity tot Of 19*7 added the Office
of the Secretary of Defence, which later action expanded both
in sirs '-rd authority. These amende? heve been placed between
the Operating agency and the source of funds in the Congress.
The action of tor ?_evel rroups in the budge + in? and funding
function?- li essentially negative. They are far removed from
the technicalities of operations so their Questions on prog-
rams tend to deal with the economy or even necessity of a
program rather than its adequacy. They hold a succession of
possible vetoes as a program moves to ultimate decision in
Congress -}.n5. the funds move back from Congress to the spending
agency. This process has lengthened the path of decision. If
the extra review and Justification has resulted in economy,
and efficiency has been maintained or increased, the delay
is defensible.
The major problem is one of determining economy and
efficiency in the military. Unlike business with its profit
yardstick there is no true measure of overall efficiency in
the military. Economy and efficiency can be furthered in
various component areas by establishment of standards and the
constant application of such tools as work measurement, auto-
mation and other measures transplantable from industry—but
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this gives no measure of overall efficiency. In the final
essence, if there is no war all military expenditures are a
waste; if the military wins a war, a certain amount of
efficiency is implied; if the nation lores the war the military
has been inefficient—or inadequate.
To obtain a more objective view of expenditures
Congress, in approving Public Law 216 in 19^9, specified a
a performance budget for the military departments. Congress
herein expressed its desire to look, at programs— to observe
what the military was doing rather than what they were buying.
In the military two opnosing views arose as to what constituted
the apDropriation program. The Navy has a program budget
based on its bureau structure; the Army and Air Force have a
nrogram budget based on their General and Air staff structure.
The old object classification did not disappear from the budget
as was intended in the performance approach. Some Congressmen
insist on maintaining subjectivity In budgetary matters, i. e.
,
which of my constituents are being benefited by these expendi-
tures? So the object classification has been retained in the
budget in the form of supporting data.
In voting the performance budget Congress also speci-
fied that the budgets and programs of the military were to be
set forth in a readily comparable form and follow a uniform
pattern. This obviously has not been attained since the Navy
has placed a different interpretation on program from that
followed by the other two services. Comparability was a
supposed virtue of performance budgeting. But comparisons are
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only valid if the functions and operations are similar. If
all the functions of the three services are the same there is
need for only one service. Again, component parts can be
compared through accounting and work measurement systems but
the situations and actions must be tested to ascertain that
they are truly comparable. The Department of Defense and
Bureau of the Budget have emphasized the "uniform pattern"
words of Congress. These agencies are troubled in their
review of the military budgets by the inconsistency of the
Navy in not following the pattern of the other services, which
is close to that of the DOD budget categories. The argument
of these agencies is for a prescribed format which facilitates
their review and fits the organizational structure they have
erected for this review. This indicates a paper uniformity
and the purpose of comparability takes on a rather hollow ring.
It borders on uniformity for uniformity's sake.
Another supposed advantage of the performance budget
is flexibility. Congress appropriates for a whole program
rather than for its comoonent parts. With this lesser degree
of specification in appropriations, funds could more readily
be moved from one program to another to respond to any shifts
in emphasis. However, with the administrative restrictions on
funding imposed by the top supervisory levels, the spending
agencies gained virtually nothing in the way of flexibility.
The greatest degree of flexibility could be given to the
Kxecutive Branch by appropriating military funds in one lump
sura. Congress would thus abdicate a considerable part of its

57
control over expenditures and the executive agency administer-
ing such funds would be vested with these abdicated powers.
Some Congressmen are concerned today that under performance




The major theme running through Chapters II, III, and
IV is that of control. In Chapter II was considered the
separate approaches *of the Army and the Navy, in their organ-
izational structures and the control afforded by the two
patterns. In the Army the chain of authority is comparatively
straight-forward while the Navy prefers to divide control into
various facets: military command, management control, techni-
cal control and coordination control.
In its report on the organization of the Navy, a
committee, under the chairmanship of the then Undersecretary
of the Navy Thomas S. Gates, in 1954 came to the following
conclusions
;
a) The present organization of the Navy is
basically sound. Essentially, active civilian control
is provided and permits the effective utilization both
of military and civilian capabilities.
b) The Committee is in full accord with the
principle of Navy organization which provides for
such division of responsibilities (division of
responsibilities between civilian and military execu-
tives) and which requires formal administrative
mechanism for coordination at all operating levels. 3°
36Report of Committee on Organization of the




The principles singled out above are civilian
control, division of responsibilities and the formal coordina-
tion required in the operation of the i;avy system.
I am not convinced that the civilian secretaries in
the Navy enjoy more control authority than those in the Army.
The Secretary of the Army can guide Army policy as well as the
Secretary of the Navy guides Navy policy. The civilian
Assistant Secretaries in the Navy are Integrated in the
organization while \hose in the Army are superimposed on the
organizational structure but in reality both groups are on
the policy level. Both depend heavily on the advice of their
military and civil service assistants in arriving at policy
decisions. "»vith the comparatively short tenures of these
Assistants they could hardly do otherwise. For the same reason
it is unlikely that the Navy Assistant Secretaries delve into
day-to-day operations any more than do those of the Army.
Whether the Navy gives more attention to a pronouncement of
the Assistant Secretary for Financial Management than does
the Array to his counterparts in that organization is a moot
point. Defense of the Navy organization on the grounds that
it gives more civilian control seems to be more fetish
than fact.
Division of resDOnslbllity (or control) has resulted in
the formal, mechanisms for coordination mentioned in the quota-
tion above. To coin another control term, "decision control"
in the Navy seems to reside, for the most part, in the welter
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of committees and boards created for the coordination purpose.
e have seen the important position of the Navy Research and
Development Review Board in research matters. However, the
oroblem of committee decision was also here demonstrated.
Parochial representations, present on committees of this
nature, lead to compromise decisions or to such delay in
decision that the overall program is not brought into focus
in time to guide the realities of execution. The Chief of
Naval Operations, as? noted, has taken steps to bring stronger
central direction to the research and development area. This
problem of ton level direction has not been acute in the Navy
so long as direct responsibility and authority over appropria-
tion? rested with each bureau. However, a single appropriation
cutting across bureau lines carries with it the legal authority
to transfer funds between functions. The enforcing of this
provision requires a single line of responsibility to be
sound from a management standpoint.
The Wavy has long faced the problem of strong advocates
for the various aspects of its total organization. In effect
the avy is a miniature Department of Defense, with responsi-
bilities on land, sea, underseas and in the air. To accommodate
these interests the Navy adopted a form of decentralization
which might be termed a loose confederation. Control and
coordination were broken down, finely defined, and parceled out
to fit this pattern. This system, through mutual consent of
the agencies involved, had worked well to date but is it
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capable of further adjustment in the face of increasing
centralization of control demanded by the budgeting and
funding patterns of higher authority.
The Future
Before the nation and the Congress today are two
further measures affecting the progression of change in budget-
ing and organization in the military.
The first of these is a bill, H. R. 8002, which has
passed both Houses 6f Congress in different form and is
awaiting further committee action in the Senate. This measure
would require budgeting in the Federal Government on an annual
accrued expenditure basis as opposed to the obligation method
now in use. Agencies would have to project for 18 months and
more ahead the goods and services to be received in a fiscal
year, advance payments, progress payments and such other
payments as are authorized by law to be made in such fiscal
year.^' The object of this proposed legislation, which is the
result of a recommendation of the report of the Second Hoover
Commission in 1955, is to enable Congress to control and limit
the large carry-overs of unexpended balances of appropriations.
The review of these balances is already the prerogative of
Congress bub this bill would require that Congress look at
every program each year. Some sort of contract or obligational
authority would still have to be granted to cover long lead-
37
85th Congress, 2nd Session, H. R. 8002.
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time capital item. (A carrier cannot "be bought, completed,
and paid for in one fiscal year.
)
Attempting to predict delivery and payment schedules
so far in advance would place an untold administrative and
accounting burden on Federal agencies to say nothing of contrac-
tors dicing business with the Government. Even if this concept
were workable, which at present seems doubtful, the return
would not be commensurate with the effort reculred. As noted,
Federal agencies and private enterprise doing government
business would have to add considerably to their accounting
anlzations to supply even a modicum of the accurate fore-
casting of expenditures required. Congress would have to
undertake the heavy burden of hearing, debating and appropriat-
ing for every program each year and would still have to commit
the Government to expenditures for capital items in future
years. The measure would promote inflexibility, in that funds
appropriated for a particular forecast might not readily
accommodate a shift in emphasis forced by new developments.
The Executive could only resort to broader programs and fewer
appropriation titles to the extent Congress would approve.
This would lead to further centralization of " xecutiv* fund
control.
Closer control always adds supervision and accounting.
Both of these are expensive items. No figures exist as to what
percentage of Federal expenditures are the result of adminis-
trative costs but this figure would likely loom quite large.
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The danger point exists when the return of control measures is
not commensurate with the expense. Perhaps the Federal Govern-
ment has already reached this point. Going beyond is
account! >r accounting's sake. Therefore, a careful watch
and review needs to be taken in this respect.
The second measure extant is the President's plan for
reorganization of the Department of Defense,™ The provisions
of this nlan call for further centralization of authority in
the Secretary of Defense, Two of these provisions are of
•special interest to the relationship of budgeting and
organization.
Chapter II brought out the traditional and legislated
position of the Chief of Isaval Operations as the ^aval Command
Assistant to the- . ecretary of the :<avy. The President apposes
to place major command authority with the Secretary of Defense,
The military departments would concentrate on primary functions
of managing the vatt administrative, training and logistics
functions of the Department of Jefense, Bias* the Chief of
Naval Operations would be left very little command authority,
would he be given business management duties which the Navy
has considered the preserve of the civilian secretaries?
The President propores that the Secretary of Defense
be given greater flexibility and directive authority over
expenditures. ihe dynamic research and development area is
38
resident i Bage: commendations Relative
to Our B:ntire Defense 7stabllshment, April 3, 1958.
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specifically singled out. Here the President calls for the
Secretary of Defense's authority over organization funds to
be made complete and unchallengeable. The President has
directed thai within the existing legislated structure, that
the Department of Defense budget estimates for I960 fiscal
year be prepared and presented in a fori; to accomplish these
ends. The details, of this direction have not as yet been
I celled out to the r;llitary departments but it is reasonable
to suspect that thaHary ill be forced to conform to the DOD
category structure for military appropriation*. If this be the
case the liavy organizational and responsibility concepts will
be subject to extren.e pressures. In view of these latest
pressures, and the apparent inevitability of increasing
.tralization as demonstrated in the steady progression of
isl< tive and administrative action in this century, perhaps
the iavy should take a long look at its position and decide the
really important issues on which it wishes to hold the line.
An inflexible stand or. organization docs not appear to strike
at the heart of the matter.
The central point is: where does the point of authority
boeoaa too remote from the responsibility for the operation?
This is especially important when that authority extends to
the shifting of funds. Can anyone unfauiiliar with the techni-
calities of sea power determine what la necessary to the
control of the seas or where emphasis should be placed to effect
this control. If authority is centered beyond the level of
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competent Judgment in decision, the division of funds might
be arbitrary and impractical—based on the caprice of the
moment. As with all facets of our national life, balance
must be maintained in defense funding.
Decision authority should be balanced with technical
competence and operational responsibility at each succeeding
step in the funding process. Flexibility in fund control
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